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The Citigroup and J.P. Morgan Chase Enron Settlements:
The Impact on the Financial Services Industry
I. INTRODUCTION

Corporate executives at financial institutions must increase
their awareness of their companies' transactions because corporate
governance is a vital issue in today's financial industry.1 Since the
establishment of the Corporate Fraud Task Force in July 2002,2
federal prosecutors have charged more than 354 defendants with
some type of corporate fraud and have convicted or obtained
guilty pleas in more than 250 corporate fraud cases, including some
related to the Enron debacle.3 In the wake of the Enron scandal,
over 5,600 jobs have been lost, 28,000 employees' pensions have
been drained, and Arthur Anderson has collapsed.4 Accountants

and investment bankers have been held criminally responsible for
their actions, while civil lawsuits have been filed against two law

firms that participated in the Enron fraud.5 As the Enron scandal
continues to unravel, the financial institutions primarily involved
with Enron, Citigroup, Inc.6 (Citigroup) and J.P. Morgan Chase7
(J.P. Morgan), are now being held accountable for their actions.8
1. See David R. Francis, Year of Reform puts Corporations on Notice, THE
Aug. 13, 2003, at 2-3.
2. President Bush's Corporate Fraud Task Force focuses on increasing the
criminal enforcement activities within the U.S. Department of Justice on corporate
fraud. The Task Force was established to increase the federal law enforcement on
corporate officials' actions and to restore the integrity of the marketplace. First Year
Report to the President-Corporate Fraud Task Force, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/first-year-report.pdf, at 8.
3. Francis, supra note 1, at 2.
4. Jeff St. Onge, Top Executives Blamed for Enron Collapse, SUNDAY BUSINESS
POST, Sept. 28, 2003, available at http://archives.tcm.ie/businesspost/2003/09/28/
story536028656.asp (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
5. See Dan Ackman, Enron Probe Widens on the Two Fronts, Forbes, Apr. 4,
2002, at http://www.forbes.com/2002/04/04/0404topnews.html; see also Ari Weinberg,
The DOJ"s De Facto Investment Bank, Forbes, Sept. 17, 2003, at
http://www.forbes.com/2003/09/17/cx aw_0917mer-print.html.
6. See generally http://www.citigroup.com (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
7. See generally http://www.jpmorgan.com (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
8. See Ben White & Peter Behr, Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Settle Over Enron
Deals, WASH. POST, July 29, 2003, at Al.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
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Both Citigroup and J.P. Morgan, two financial giants,
financed transactions for Enron that allowed Enron's management
to present misleading financial results to shareholders, analysts,
and the marketplace.9 Citigroup and J.P. Morgan primarily used
"prepay" transactions that allowed Enron to disguise loans as
commodities transactions.' °
"Prepay" transactions involve triangular deals where an
original company (Enron) enters into a transaction with another
company (a shell corporation) which enters into a transaction with
the financial institution, which enters into a transaction with the
original company." "The net effect of these deals [is that the
original company ends up] being the shipper and receiver of the
same commodity, due at the same price on the same day."' 2 Under
these transactions, all the multiple deals cancel each other out,
except the original company who receives a large amount of cash,
which must be paid back to the financial institutions with interest. 3
The results of these deals are merely loans to the original
corporation disguised as commodities transactions. 4 Through
several prepays, Citigroup and J.P. Morgan lent Enron $6.4 billion
dollars. 5 These transactions enabled Enron to report non-existent
earnings and conceal the discrepancy between actual and reported
earnings from financial analysts and investors. 16
Citigroup and Enron also entered into special purposes
entities (SPEs) 1' transactions in which Enron converted cash

9. Id.
10. Kurt Eichenwald & Riva D. Atlas, 2 Banks Settle Accusations They Aided in
Enron Fraud,N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2003, at Al.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Eichenwald & Atlas, supra note 10.
16. See Citi and Morgan Chase agree to pay $289-mil. to settle charges related to
Enron deals, GLOBAL POWER REPORT, July 31, 2003, at 1 [hereinafter Global Power
Report].
17. Special Purposes Entities (SPEs) operate as a trust for a company. See THE
CORPORATE LIBRARY, at http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/spotlight/accounting/
SPEs.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2004). The company creates the SPE and sells it an
asset to fund a new project or product. Id. That asset is also removed from the
company's balance sheet. Id. Some companies, including Enron, use these entities
purposely to keep debt off the balance sheet. Id.
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received from financing activities to cash from operations. 18
Citigroup financed the off-balance sheet SPEs for Enron.1 9 These
SPEs, such as Project Nahanni, purchased short-term government
securities which were then quickly sold with "the proceeds [being]
booked as cash flow from operations." 20 Although Citigroup and
J.P. Morgan's transactions with Enron were arguably legal, the
transactions deceived investors and forced the financial institutions
to settle with bank regulators and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).2 1

This Note addresses two main issues related to Citigroup's
and J.P. Morgan's settlement with regulators. Part II of this Note
will discuss the particular details of the settlements. Part III of
this Note will discuss the implications of the settlements for these
particular financial institutions as well as for the financial services
industry. Part IV of this Note will discuss the possible negative
effects arising from the settlements.24
II.

DETAILS OF THE SETTLEMENTS

Although Citigroup and J.P. Morgan were both heavily
involved in the Enron scandal, they received different punishments
from the SEC. 25 Under these settlements, Citigroup and J.P.
Morgan will pay fines of $101 million and $135 million,
respectively. 26 In determining the settlements with the financial
institutions, the SEC took into account how each company
"[cooperated] with the [SEC's] investigation, as well as its timely
18. Global Power Report, supra note 16; see also In the Matter of Citigroup, Inc.,
7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) $ 75,482, at 63,160 to 63,173 (July 28, 2003), available at
(last visited Feb. 7, 2004)
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-48230.htm
[hereinafter Citigroup Enforcement Action].
19. Eichenwald & Atlas, supra note 10.
20. Id.
21. See Floyd Norris, A Warning Shot to Banks on Role in Others' Fraud, N.Y.
TIMES, July 29, 2003, at C1.
22. See infra notes 25-44 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 45-134 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 135-158 and accompanying text.
25. Norris, supra note 21.
26. Press Release, SEC, SEC Settles Enforcement Proceedings against
J.P. Morgan Chase and Citigroup (July 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2003-87.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2004) [hereinafter SEC Press Release].
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efforts to resolve the matter., 27 Citigroup paid less in fines than
J.P. Morgan because Citigroup officials were more cooperative
with the SEC investigations.28
Citigroup accepted a "cease and desist" order issued by the
SEC in an administrative proceeding, while JP Morgan accepted a
civil injunction prohibiting it from committing future violations of
Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and
Exchange Act Rule 10b-5.29 Under a "cease and desist" order,
there is no automatic contempt of court penalty for violating the
order.3" However, if Citigroup refuses to comply with the order,
then the administrative law judge has the discretion to impose
additional civil penalties.3 According to an SEC official, the J.P.
Morgan injunction was meant to "send a signal" to other
organizations that are not cooperative with SEC investigations.3 2 If
J.P. Morgan engages in more Enron-like transactions, it will have
violated a court order and have committed a criminal infraction.33
The SEC warned it would be willing to file criminal charges if such
an infraction occurs.3 4 The injunction against J.P. Morgan was
similar to the SEC's injunction against Arthur Anderson.35 Arthur
Anderson violated that injunction in its dealings with Enron,
commencing the criminal case that led to the dissolution of the
well-respected accounting firm.36
In addition to their settlement with the SEC, J.P. Morgan
and Citigroup will each pay a combined total of $25 million to the

27. Id.
28. Norris, supra note 21.
29. Id.; see also Citigroup Enforcement Action, supra note 18; SEC v. J.P.
75,481, at 63,158 to 63,160 (July
Morgan Chase & Co., 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH)
28, 2003), availableat http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18252.htm (last visited
Feb. 7, 2004) [hereinafter J.P. Morgan Enforcement Action].
30. Thomas C. Newkirk, Remarks at 1 6' Annual International Symposium on
Economic Crime (Sept. 19, 1998) (transcript at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
speecharchive/1998/spch222.htm) (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
31. See id.
32. Robert Julavits, Chase, Citi Style Differences Reflected in Enron Settlements,
AM. BANKER, July 29, 2003, at 1.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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state and city of New York to avoid criminal prosecution. 37 Robert
M. Morgenthau, of the Manhattan district attorney's office,
decided not to pursue criminal charges and instead settled with
J.P. Morgan and Citigroup.38 Mr. Morgenthau believed it would
have been difficult to prove intentional fraud on a particular
individual and that the financial institutions would already suffer
tremendously as Enron's biggest creditors.39 Additionally, under
this settlement Citigroup was ordered to revamp its internal
controls to ensure greater disclosure of structured finance
transactions, such as prepays and SPEs.4 °
Both financial
institutions also agreed with state and federal banking regulators
to overhaul their risk management practices, including credit
exposure.

4

Citigroup and J.P. Morgan have also reached agreements
with the Federal Reserve Board.42 Under these agreements,
although there were no monetary penalties, the financial
institutions agreed to submit a revised set of standards for complex
deals such as SPEs.43 Citigroup and J.P. Morgan also agreed to

strengthen their internal risk management procedures.'

37. Global Power Report, supra note 16.
38. Id.
39. White & Behr, supra note 8.
40. See Citigroup Enforcement Action, supra note 18; see also J.P. Morgan
Enforcement Action, supra note 29.
41. Global Power Report, supra note 16.
42. Eichenwald & Atlas, supra note 10; see J.P. Morgan Chase, Federal Reserve
Bank of N.Y. and N.Y. State Banking Dept. Agreement, available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/enforcement/2003/200307282/attachment.pdf.
(last visited Feb. 7, 2004) [hereinafter J.P. Morgan Federal Reserve Agreement]; see
Citigroup Inc. and Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y. Agreement, available at
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/enforcement/2003/20030728/attachment.pdf
(last visited Feb. 7,2004) [hereinafter Citigroup Federal Reserve Agreement].
43. See J.P. Morgan Federal Reserve Agreement, supra note 42; see also
Citigroup Federal Reserve Agreement, supra note 42. Citigroup and J.P. Morgan
revised standards provide for greater review by top management over complex
transactions. Eichenwald & Atlas, supra note 10.
44. See Citigroup: Enron settlements with the SEC, Federal Reserve, OCC, and
Manhattan DA, THE ASIAN BANKER J., July 31, 2003 (on file with NCBI) [hereinafter
Asian Banker]; see J.P. Morgan Federal Reserve Agreement, supra note 42; see
Citigroup Federal Reserve Agreement, supra note 42.
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III. IMPLICATION OF THE SETTLEMENTS

A.

Effect of the Settlements on Citigroup and J.P. Morgan

These settlements will affect Citigroup and J.P. Morgan in
various areas of their overall business structures."a The most
significant impact is monetary because under these settlement
agreements the two financial institutions combined will pay over
$300 million to the SEC and the Manhattan District Attorney's
Office.4 6 Although, neither Citigroup nor J.P. Morgan conceded

guilt under their respective settlement agreements, the mere fact
of such a large settlement with bank regulators may be viewed as
an admission of guilt and could strengthen the shareholder suits
relating to Enron.47
Some commentators believe that an unexpected
consequence of the penalties imposed by the SEC is that the
penalties may be advantageous to Citigroup and J.P. Morgan if
class action suits are brought against them.48 Pursuant to the Fair
Fund provision49 of Section 308(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 5"
enacted in 2002, settlement money paid to the SEC can be credited
against any final settlement of a class action suit.5" The fines will
settle all charges with the SEC and provide some protection

45. See Norris, supra note 21.
46. See White & Behr, supra note 8.
47. See id; see also Citigroup Enforcement Action, supra note 18; see also J.P.
Morgan Enforcement Action, supra note 29.
48. See Eichenwald & Atlas, supra note 10.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2003). Section 308 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act entitled "Fair
Funds for Investors" allows the SEC in particular cases to distribute civil money
penalties to the harmed investor. Stephen M. Culter, Testimony Concerning
Returning Funds to Defrauded Investor (Feb. 2, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/022603tssmc.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2004). Prior
to the act, when the SEC received monetary penalties it was required to transfer the
funds to the Department of Treasury. Id.
50. Sarbanes Oxley Act was signed into law in 2002 by President Bush. A
Practical Guide to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (July 2003), available at
http://www.clm.com/pubs/pub-1109477_l.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2004). This Act
amends certain provisions of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act through increasing
corporate disclosure, corporate governance, and sanctions for wrongdoings. Id..
51. Global Power Report, supra note 16; see Citigroup Enforcement Action,
supra note 18; see J.P. Morgan Enforcement Action, supra note 29.
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against future private class action suits. 52 Thus, the fines the
financial institutions paid under the settlement are possibly less of
a deterrent because the amounts may offset any future
judgments.53
However, other commentators believe the settlements may
make Citigroup and J.P. Morgan more vulnerable to private
shareholder litigation arising from their transactions with Enron.54
More specifically, the cost of settling lawsuits with Enron's
shareholders will likely increase; the settlements with the SEC may
provide Enron's investors with a basis for directly suing the
financial institutions.
Even though Citigroup and J.P. Morgan did not admit to
guilt in their settlements, other Enron creditors will use these
settlements to their advantage in attempting to recover their losses
related to Enron directly from the financial institutions.56 One
attorney who represents some of Enron's shareholders stated that,
"[o]n a psychological basis I think it's going to motivate the
shareholders to hold out for more., 57 "The banks are not paying
this amount of money for charity purposes."58 Similarly, the
settlements may give credibility to Enron's shareholders' claims in
their anticipated shareholder class action lawsuit.59
The settlements will also affect Citigroup and J.P. Morgan
as creditors in Enron's bankruptcy proceedings.6" Citigroup and
52. Eichenwald & Atlas, supra note 10, "[Tlhis money is going to do double
duty." Id. (quoting John C. Coffee Jr., Professor at Columbia University Law
School).
53. Emily Thornton & Mike France, For Enron's Bankers, a "Get out of Jail
Free" Card, Bus. WK., Aug. 11, 2003, at 29. Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the fines
that were paid to the SEC will also be allocated to reimburse investors who lost
money in the Enron fraud. See Citigroup Enforcement Action, supra note 18.
54. See John D. Glater, Banking Giants Further Tangle The Enron Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, July 30, 2003, at C1.

55. Id.; Onge, supra note 4.
56. See Glater, supra note 54. Enron's creditors will likely bring private suits
against Citigroup and J.P. Morgan in an attempt to recover their losses related to
Enron, especially given the low possibility of recovering all they are owed from
Enron. Id.
57. Id.
58. White & Behr, supra note 8 (quoting Henry T.C. Hu, Professor at Columbia
Law School).
59. See White & Behr, supra note 8.
60. Norris, supra note 21.
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J.P. Morgan are the two largest creditors in the Enron bankruptcy
proceedings.6 Neal Batson, Enron's bankruptcy examiner,
recently released a statement asserting that "there is sufficient
evidence of inequitable conduct by six financial institutions,
including Citigroup and J.P. Morgan," that would not allow them
to recover their claims on an equal basis in relation to other
creditors in Enron's bankruptcy proceedings.62 Since Citigroup and
J.P. Morgan were involved in Enron's financial deception, other
Enron creditors can make a valid argument that under the
doctrine of equitable subordination 63 it would not be equitable to
allow Citigroup and J.P. Morgan to recover the same amount as
the other creditors who acted in good faith.' Under this doctrine,
the financial institutions' claims of approximately $4.2 billion
would be subordinated to the claims of other creditors.
However, in order for equitable subordination to be applicable to
Citigroup's and J.P. Morgan's particular situation, Enron's
creditors would have to prove that Citigroup and J.P. Morgan
breached a fiduciary duty or were engaged in fraudulent activities;
the creditors may decide that the litigation costs would outweigh
any recovery.6 6
Other companies that may have claims against Citigroup or
J.P. Morgan could be encouraged to file suit because the
settlements show that the financial institutions are already willing
to settle cases regarding their participation in the Enron scandal.6 7
For example, The Vanguard Group recently sued Citigroup
claiming that Citigroup sold it Enron bonds worth $70 million,
even though Citigroup knew at the time that Enron was in

61. Onge, supra note 4.
62. See Norris, supra note 21; see also In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034, (S.D.N.Y.
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/
28,
2003),
available at
July
enronbk72803xr3.pdf at 5 (last visited Feb. 7, 2004) [hereinafter Enron Bankruptcy
Case].
63. 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2003). The doctrine of equitable subordination is based on
principles of equity that assumes it would not be fair to allow the Citigroup and J.P.
Morgan to recover as much as the other creditors who were not involved in the
downfall of the corporation. Glater, supra note 54.
64. See Glater, supra note 54.
65. See White & Behr, supra note 8.
66. See Glater, supra note 54.
67. See generally id.
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financial trouble.6 8 Citigroup and J.P. Morgan have also recently
been sued by other lenders of Enron. 69 These suits, filed by private
companies that invest in bank loans, alleged that Citigroup and
J.P. Morgan were encouraging other investors to rely on Enron's
financial statements while aware of the documents' misleading
nature.7" These lawsuits came less than one month after Citigroup
and J.P. Morgan settled with bank regulators.7 1 Citigroup and J.P.
Morgan have also been sued by Enron itself.7
After the
settlements with bank regulators, Enron's new management, on
behalf of the company, sued the financial institutions for their
involvement in financing transactions that led to the bankruptcy of
Enron.73
In addition, the financial institutions have established
reserves for future litigation related to their involvement in the
Enron scandal.74 J.P. Morgan has reserved $700 million for matters
related to Enron, while Citigroup has reserved $1.3 billion related
to Enron and Dynegy matters.7 5 Citigroups' reserves will be
reflected on their financial statements as a one-time charge against
earnings.7 6
The settlements with the SEC and bank regulators not only
cost Citigroup and J.P. Morgan monetarily, but it also damaged
their reputations.77 Because of the settlements, the financial
68. Jathon Sapsford & Aaron Lucchetti, Vanguard Sues Citigroup Over EnronBond Deals, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2003, at C5.
69. John Hintze, Another Suit Filed Against Enron Bankers, BANK LOAN REP.,
Aug. 11, 2003, available at 2003 WL 7846802.
70. Id. DK Acquisition Partners and Springfield Associates have filed suit against
Citigroup and J.P. Morgan claiming these companies encouraged investors to rely on
Enron's financial statements when they knew the documents were misleading. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Debtor's Complaint for the Avoidance and Return.. .Together with
objections and counterclaims to creditor Defendant's claims, In re Enron Corp., et al.,
No. 01-16034, (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2003), available at http://news.findlaw.com/
hdocs/docs/enron/eciti92403advprcd.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2004).
73. Kristen Hays, Enron Sues Investment Banks, Brokerages, Associated Press,
Sept. 25, 2003. Bankruptcy laws require Enron to attempt to recover as much as
possible for its creditors. Id.
74. Glater, supra note 54.
75. Id. Citigroup also set up prepay transactions with Dynegy under which they
provided the company with $300 million in disguised loans. Id.
76. Id.
77. Robert Julavits, Citi Gives $2m to Habitatfor Humanity, AM. BANKER, July
30, 2003, at 20.
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institutions have spent additional resources in an attempt to
restore their respective images in the financial community. 8 A day
after the settlement with the SEC, Citigroup donated $2 million to
Habitat for Humanity as a symbol of the company "being a good
corporate citizen" that has improved its ethical behavior. "
As a result of the settlements, the financial institutions will
expend financial and human capital to redesign their internal
controls.8 ° Under Citigroup's and J.P. Morgan's settlements with
the Federal Reserve Board, each have agreed to increase risk
management controls and provide the regulatory agencies with a
new set of standards where senior executives will review complex
transactions, such as transactions involving SPEs.81 Internal
controls will be augmented in three key areas: 1) credit risk
management, 2) legal and reputational risk management, and 3)
approval and progress reports.82 The financial institutions will
spend many man-hours modifying and updating their risk
management systems.83 J.P. Morgan also has to file revised
standards with the New York State Banking Department which
will require additional time and effort.84
The settlements have changed the way the two financial
institutions conduct their overall businesses. For example,
Citigroup has implemented a new internal control where it will
only provide structured financing to customers that fully disclose
the financial impact of the transaction to its investors.85 Citigroup

78. Id.
79. Id. (Interviewing Robert B. Willumstad who is chairman and chief executive
officer of Citi's Global Consumer Group).
80. See generally Eichenwald & Atlas, supra note 10; see Citigroup Enforcement
Action, supra note 18; see J.P. Morgan Enforcement Action, supra note 29.
81. Eichenwald & Atlas, supra note 10; see also J.P. Morgan Federal Reserve
Agreement, supra note 42; see also Citigroup Federal Reserve Agreement, supra
note 42.
82. J.P. Morgan Federal Reserve Agreement, supra note 42; Citigroup Federal
Reserve Agreement, supra note 42.
83. See generally Eichenwald & Atlas, supra note 10.
84. See Julavits, supra note 32, at 1; see J.P. Morgan Enforcement Action, supra
note 29.
85. Hintze, supra note 69.
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and J.P. Morgan have also agreed not to perform transactions
86
where the required accounting is likely to deceive investors.
Although Citigroup and J.P. Morgan have settled with the
SEC and the bank regulators, these settlements do not clear the
individual bankers at these financial institutions from liability
related to transactions with Enron.8 7 The Department of Justice is
still investigating criminal liability related to the Enron scandal.88
The SEC retained the option of filing civil charges against Enron's
financial partners, including individual bankers at Citigroup and
J.P. Morgan, which may amount to additional penalties and
banishment from the financial services industry. 89
B.

Impact of the Settlements on the FinancialServices Industry

The Citigroup and J.P. Morgan settlements with the SEC
and bank regulators will have a significant impact on the entire
financial services industry.9" The behavioral and internal changes
that Citigroup and J.P. Morgan have made as a part of these
settlements will likely serve as a guide to the rest of the financial
industry.9 The settlements signal that financial institutions can be
held liable for the financial effects of transactions with their
clients.92 Thus, if the transaction is legal, but the financial
institution has knowledge that the transaction will deceive
investors, then the financial institution can be held liable. 93
Stephen Cutler, the SEC's director of enforcement, says
"[f]inancial institutions may not look the other way when their
clients use them to manipulate financial results."'94

86. Tom Perrotta, Banks Settle Suit, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, July 30, 2003,
Vol. 229 at 4, available at WL 7/30/2003 TLI 4. (on file with NCBI).
87. See Emily Thornton and Mike France, Enron's Bankers: A Great Prison
Escape, Bus. WK. ONLINE, July 31, 2003, at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/
dnflash/jul2003/nf20030731_4717_db042.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2004).
88. See generally Norris, supra note 21.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. White & Behr, supra note 8.
92. Eichenwald & Atlas, supra note 10.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) views the SEC settlements with
Citigroup and J.P. Morgan as "[a] clear message that U.S. bankers,
brokers, accountants and lawyers have an obligation to analyze
and understand the consequences of their actions, and they will be
held accountable for deceptive transactions."95 Other financial
institutions should regard the settlements as a reminder "that you
can't turn a blind eye to the consequences of your actions. If you
know or have reason to know that you are helping a company
mislead its investors, you are in violation of the federal securities
laws."9 6 Executives at financial institutions will need to ensure a
greater understanding of complex transactions with their clients.97
Which transactions will serve as "red flags" to bank
regulators is a question that has been raised, but not completely
answered, by the settlements.98 Bank regulators have stated simply
that financial institutions will be held liable for transactions that
deceive investors.99 Citigroup and J.P. Morgan used SPEs and
prepay transactions that allowed Enron to misrepresent its
earnings."° From the settlements, other financial institutions are
aware that a transaction involving prepays or SPEs is prohibited if
it deceives investors, but how far this will be extended is not
clear.' For example, derivative transactions generally generate
financial or tax results different from a normal economic
transaction." 2 Does this mean that financial institutions will be
held responsible for all such transactions? 3 The Citigroup and
J.P. Morgan settlements provide a good starting point by giving
some examples of the transactions that financial institutions can be

95. Id.
96. Perrotta, supra note 86, at 4.
97. See generally Norris, supra note 21.
98. See id.
99. See Eichenwald & Atlas, supra note 10.
100. See generally id.
101. Norris, supra note 21.
102. Id. For example, some derivatives are designed to enable banks to receive the
economic benefits of owning stock in a particular company even though it is not
allowed to buy such shares. If financial institutions were required to tell regulators
the purpose of these transactions, then it may depress the derivative market. Id.
103. See id.

2004]

FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING AND DERIVATIVES

259

held accountable for, but it is still unclear exactly which
transactions are prohibited." °
These settlements show an enforcement trend of bank
regulators holding financial institutions responsible for the impact
of transactions they finance.'°5 Even though bank regulators do not
have jurisdiction to prosecute the violation of criminal laws, they
can and will increase their criminal referrals to offices that can
criminally prosecute, such as the Manhattan district attorney's
office. 6 With the rising trend in prosecuting corporate officials,
these criminal referrals will receive more attention, especially
given the ambiguity of the new corporate governance laws.'0 7 To
avoid prosecution, financial institutions will need to ensure that
they stay in compliance with the new internal controls regulations
imposed by the Federal Reserve Board and remain abreast of new
risk management requirements in the industry. 8
Due to the role of SPEs in Enron's collapse, the Financial
Accounting Standards Board issued Interpretation No. 46,
Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities (Fin. 46), to clarify the
accounting for SPEs. 1°9 Fin. 46 will require the financial
institutions to consolidate SPEs onto their balance sheets."0
However, Fin. 46 has the potential to make trust-preferred
securities appear as ordinary debt, which would disqualify them
104. Id.
105. See Thomas P. Vartanian, New Banking Laws Starting to Transform
Enforcement, AM. BANKER, Sept. 26, 2003, at 11; see generally White & Behr, supra
note 8.
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. See id. Manhattan district attorney Robert Morgenthau in a letter to Alan
Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, pleaded for a ban on all
transactions where U.S. financial institutions conduct business with "notoriously
uncooperative secrecy jurisdictions" such as the Cayman Islands. Perrotta, supra note
86, at 4. Although this suggestion is far-reaching, financial institutions must be aware
that there may be some heighten inquiries by bank regulators into U.S. banks that
perform multiple transactions with such countries. Id.
109. Todd Davenport, Breaking Down Fin 46, Line by Business Line, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 3, 2003, at 1. Financial Accounting Standards Board 46, Consolidation
of Variable-Interest Entities is a new accounting rule that forces companies to reflect
the risk of their off-balance sheet entities in their financial statements. Liz Moyer,
Trust Preferreds Could Fall to SPE Rule Change, Some Hope for Compromise with
Regulators, AM. BANKER, Aug. 7, 2003, at 1. The FASB attempts to properly assign
risk in various complex transactions to the appropriate user. Id.
110. Moyer, supra note 109, at 1.
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from Tier 1 capital status."' Currently, federal regulators are
waiting to see if Fin. 46 applies to trust-preferred securities or
whether they require deconsolidation." If Fin. 46 does apply to
trust-preferred securities, then it would lower some financial
institutions capital ratios significantly, forcing them to increase
assets or decrease liabilities." 3
Citigroup and J.P. Morgan may have been relieved from
14
criminal prosecution due to their immense size and complexity.
Robert M. Morgenthau, of the Manhattan district attorney's office,
has stated that when dealing with organizations the size of
Citigroup and JP Morgan, it will be difficult to pinpoint a single
responsible party." 5 If this is an accurate assessment, then officials
at smaller financial institutions need to recognize that criminal
liability may be imposed on them due to regulators' ability to trace
16
transactions to a single individual."
Bank regulators have allowed Citigroup and J.P. Morgan to
become enormous financial institutions as a result of regulatory
and congressional actions, such as the repeal of the Glass-Steagall
Act, which has allowed them to offer many different services."' In
allowing this growth, regulators have fostered an environment
where they are unable to hold individuals in these larger financial
institutions personally responsible for their actions. 1 8 While these
settlements may send a message to officials at smaller financial
institutions that they may be held criminally liable for
inappropriate transactions, these same settlements may send a
different message to officials at larger institutions. "' Officials at
111. Id. Trust preferred securities are treated as debt for tax purposes, but still
counted as Tier 1 capital - a key financial ratio that measures a banks capital
stability. Matt Andrejczak, Banks Trust Preferred Securities as a Financing Tool,
WASH. Bus. J., March 19, 1998.
112. Davenport, supra note 109, at 1.
113. Moyer, supra note 109, at 20. "Capital status" is a key measure of financial
strength. Tier 1 status, which is primarily equity, helps to determine financial
institutions capital ratios. Id.
114. See Gary Silverman, Dr. Frankenstein and the Monster Banks, FIN. TIMES,
Aug. 6, 2003, at 21, available at 2003 WL 60566665.
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. Silverman, supra note 114.
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large financial institutions may believe they will not be held
personally responsible for their actions because it will be too
difficult to trace transactions back to them. 2 '
Many commentators also believe that Citigroup and J.P.
Morgan officials may have been saved from criminal liability
because they are the largest creditors of Enron and will incur
heavy losses from Enron's collapse.' 2' Therefore, other financial
institutions that are involved in transactions that deceive investors,
but are not creditors of a failing company, may22be more likely to
be held criminally responsible for their actions.
Susan Schmidt Bies, a member of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, stated in a speech before the
Conference of State Bank Supervisors that financial institutions
that have had problems in the past two years lacked the necessary
internal controls because management has been more concerned
with financial results. 23 The lack of proper internal controls was a
key factor in the Enron debacle.' 24 As a result of this problem,
Citigroup and J.P. Morgan have agreed to revamp their internal
controls under their respective agreements with the Federal
Reserve Board. 2 As such, management at other financial
institutions should be more involved in designing and
implementing internal controls to mitigate risks.1 26 To ensure
successful internal control audits, Governor Bies suggests that the
audits be focused on the higher risk areas and reviewed
regularly.

127

120. See id.

121. See Global Power Report, supra note 16.
122. Id.

123. Governor Susan Schmidt Bies, Remarks at the Conference of State Bank
Supervisors (May 30, 2003), at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/
2003/20030530/default.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
124. Kavaljit Singh, The Enron Debacle: The Rise and Fall of a Global
Corporation, at http://www.ibon.org/news/if/02/10.htm (Feb. 20, 2002) (last visited

Feb.7, 2004).
125. See J.P. Morgan Federal Reserve Agreement, supra note 42; see Citigroup
Federal Reserve Agreement, supra note 42.
126. See Bies, supra note 123.
127. Id.
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Under the settlements with the SEC, J.P. Morgan will pay
more in monetary fines than Citigroup.128 During the SEC's
investigations, Citigroup cooperated with the investigations, while
J.P. Morgan continued to maintain for months that it had done
nothing wrong. 129 The discrepancy in the type of settlements and
severity of fines between Citigroup and J.P. Morgan indicate that
financial institutions should fully cooperate with SEC
investigations in order to avoid more severe punishment. 3 °
Lastly, the settlements provide notice to other financial
institutions that if they use deceptive transactions, such as those
used by Citigroup and J.P. Morgan (i.e. SPEs and "prepays"), they
will encounter major legal problems.' 3 ' "All financial institutions
need to take a broad view of their responsibilities to assess the
economic substance and consequences of the transactions they
enter into."'' 3 2 In a letter to Robert M. Morgenthau, the Manhattan
district attorney, vice-chairman of J.P. Morgan Marc J. Shapiro
wrote, "[o]ur view historically.., was that our clients and their
accountants were responsible for the clients' proper accounting
and disclosure of the transactions."' 33 Now, his bank will "hold
[itself] to a higher standard" and become more 3 involved in
understanding and structuring financial transactions.1 1
IV.

POSSIBLE NEGATIVE EFFECTS ARISING FROM THE
SETTLEMENTS

Although they do not create binding precedent, the SEC
settlements with Citigroup and J.P. Morgan demonstrate to the
rest of the financial services industry that as public companies,
financial institutions must be careful not to mislead shareholders in
addition to complying with all relevant banking laws. 135 The recent
128. See White & Behr, supra note 8.
129. Id.
130. Julavits, supra note 32, at 1.
131. See Norris, supra note 21.
132. Paul Waldie, U.S. Banks will pay to settle Enron Claims, GLOBE AND MAIL,
July 29, 2003, at B1 (quoting Robert M. Morgenthau).
133. Norris, supra note 21.
134. Id.
135. Id.; see also Editorial, Enron's Friends in Need, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2003, at
A24.
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SEC settlements sent a message to the financial services industry
that the SEC has been revitalized. 36 These recent settlements
display the SEC's commitment to restore investor confidence in
the marketplace.'37
The settlements, however, may have a negative impact on
the financial services industry as a result of financial institutions
inferring that they can avoid criminal prosecution by merely
paying a fine.1 38 Manhattan district attorney Robert M.
Morgenthau stopped pursuing the criminal charges against
Citigroup and J.P. Morgan - instead opting for a $50 million
fine. 39 Morgenthau claims that the district attorney's office would
not have been able to prove that "any individual acted with the
intent to commit fraud." 4 ' Thus, the settlement was to punish the
financial institutions and obtain money for the victims in the
Enron scandal.14" '
The SEC settlements with Citigroup and J.P. Morgan may
also support the view that these risky transactions are a cost of
doing business.'42 Citigroup and J.P. Morgan earned significant
revenues from these transactions. 143 Financial institutions may
balance the risk of paying penalties versus the benefit of receiving
revenue for these structured finance transactions.' Although the
civil penalties amounted to $300 million, this is less than 2% of the
annual profits of these financial institutions and far less than the
fees they earned from their dealings with Enron. 4 5 With the recent
fines imposed on Citigroup and J.P. Morgan representing
approximately one week's profit to the banks, these settlements
may have sent the message that if financial institutions pay a hefty
fine they can avoid criminal prosecution. 4 6 Therefore, the SEC
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

See Francis, supra note 1, at 2.
See id.
Editorial, The Bigger They Are, N.J.L.J., Aug. 25, 2003, at 18.
See White & Behr, supra note 8.
Id.
Id.
See Thornton & France, supra note 53, at 29.
White & Behr, supra note 8.
See generally Thornton & France, supra note 53, at 29.
See Editorial, supra note 138, at 18.
See Thornton & France, supra note 53, at 29.
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may have signaled to corporate executives that they will not be
147
personally liable for their actions.
This past July marked the one-year anniversary of
President Bush's corporate fraud task force which has been
involved in punishing corporate officers and restoring investors'
confidence in the market. 48 In a warning to corporate executives
who are involved in deceiving investors, President Bush stated,
"[y]ou will be exposed and you will be punished. No boardroom in
America is above or beyond the law."' 4 9 However, a week later
the SEC settled with Citigroup and J.P. Morgan and allowed their
corporate executives to pay civil penalties and avoid criminal
prosecution. 5 ' Citigroup and J.P. Morgan executives helped Enron
deceive investors, yet the executives who participated in the
deception will not face criminal penalties. 5 ' Investors might lose
confidence in the market if companies are allowed to pay fines to
settle their deceptive transactions.' 52
The SEC settled with Citigroup and J.P. Morgan to ensure
that investors who lost money in the Enron scandal received
something back on their investment, despite the negative effects of
the settlement. 153 Some commentators believe the SEC settled to
54
protect J.P. Morgan and Citigroup from Arthur Anderson's fate.
"Investigators knew what happened when the government moved
against Enron's auditors at Anderson: the accounting firm blew
up. Who wanted to take the chance that a big bank might fall into
a similar death spiral?' ' 155 The SEC may have realized that if it
continued to investigate Citigroup or J.P. Morgan, the financial
institutions may have had a similar outcome to Arthur Anderson,
147. Editorial, supra note 138, at 18.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Editorial, supra note 138, at 18. One of the SEC's duties is to ensure that
investors are confident that they are making a sound investment decision based on
complete and accurate data. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission: The SEC:
Who We Are, What We Do, at http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last
visited Feb. 7, 2004).
153. Global Power Report, supra note 16.
154. Silverman, supra note 114.
155. Id.
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a result that would have been drastic to the economy.5 6 Robert M.
Morgenthau, Manhattan district attorney, is quoted as saying,

"[y]ou have to be concerned with the impact on the financial
markets with whatever you do."' 5 7 Our economy is currently
recovering from a recession and may not have been able to
withstand the downfall of a financial giant such as a J.P. Morgan,
58
who manages a derivative book worth more than $30,600 billion.
V. CONCLUSION

The Citigroup and J.P. Morgan settlements provide an
insight into an evolving trend of corporate governance in today's
marketplace.'59 The move toward holding a company's officials
responsible for their actions may not be fully exhibited in these
settlements, but nonetheless these settlements are a step in the
right direction. 61 Other financial institutions can learn a number of
lessons from the Citigroup and J.P. Morgan's experiences with
6
regulators. 1
First, financial institutions should implement new internal
control policies to ensure that they do not permit the type of
transactions that caused the Enron scandal. 62 The behavioral
changes promised by Citigroup and J.P. Morgan should serve as a
model for other financial institutions. 63 Both companies agreed to
change their compliance monitoring, risk management, and
business practices related to complex structured finance
transactions.164 Both financial institutions have also agreed to
change their internal controls and apply closer scrutiny to how
65
their clients account for transactions in which they are involved.

156,
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Francis, supra note 1,at 2-3.
Editorial, supra note 138, at 18.
See White & Behr, supra note 8.
Id; see also Eichenwald & Atlas, supra note 10.
Id.
See Julavits, supra note 32, at 1.
Perrotta, supra note 86, at 4.
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Second, financial institutions should keep abreast of the
changing compliance requirements of bank regulators 166 and
regularly review internal audits to ensure they are focused on the
167
high risk areas of the company.
Third, financial institutions should gain a better
understanding of their clients' transactions and ensure that they
are not helping their clients deceive investors. 168 The SEC's
settlements with Citigroup and J.P. Morgan raise important issues
concerning the ability and duty of financial institutions to evaluate
what effect complex structured finance transactions will have on
their clients. 69 These settlements suggest that if a financial
institution is involved in such a transaction, it should gain a
complete understanding of the transaction, disclose how the
transaction creates risk for the financial institution, and determine
the appropriateness of participating in the transaction. 70
Other financial institutions can learn from Citigroup's and
J.P. Morgan's settlements because the two giants are not the only
financial institutions to participate in risky, complex, structured
finance transactions with their clients.'
Other financial
institutions need to be careful because, as Senator Carl Levin'72
stated, "[t]he July 2003 settlements with Citigroup and J.P.
Morgan are only the latest in what will likely be a long series of
enforcement actions arising from the financial scandals of the last
two years." 13
VAUGHN K. REYNOLDS

166. See Bies, supra note 123.
167. Id.
168. See generally Eichenwald & Atlas, supra note 10.
169. Vartanian, supra note 105, at 11.
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